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Achieving Real Regulatory Reform
Robert W. Hahnt
The world is in the midst of two profound regulatory chang-
es. First, there is a trend toward deregulation of heavily regulat-
ed industries and privatization of state-owned enterprises.1 In
many of the former communist countries, for example, privatiza-
tion has become a central feature of reform.2 In the United
States, deregulation remains a major policy concern, as evidenced
by recent movements to promote competition in the telecommu-
nications3 and electricity industries.4
Second, as politicians find it more difficult to satisfy constitu-
ency demands through budgetary means, there has been a grow-
ing interest in rethinking how governments administer social
regulation, particularly in the areas of health, safety, and envi-
ronmental protection.5 Here, economic analysis is likely to play a
more prominent role in both setting and achieving goals. For
example, the United States recently enacted a number of laws
aimed at increasing legislative and agency accountability for the
benefits and costs of regulation and controlling unfunded man-
dates imposed by the federal government on the private sector
t Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and Research Associate at
University. The views in this paper reflect those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the institutions with which he is affiliated. The research assistance
of Jonathan Siskin, Fumie Yokota, and Elizabeth Cooper is gratefully acknowledged.
1 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Regulatory Reform,
Privatization, and Competition Policy 47-123 (OECD 1992); Dennis J. Gayle and Jonathan
N. Goodrich,'Privatization and Deregulation in Global Perspective (Quorum 1990).
2 Roman Frydman, et al, The Privatization Process in Central Europe (CEU 1993);
Roman Frydman, et al, The Privatization Process in Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic
States (CEU 1993).
' Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-104, 110 Stat 56, codified at 47
USC § 151 et seq (1994 & Supp 1996).
' Peter Coy and Gary McWilliams, Electricity: The Power Shift Ahead, Business
Week 78 (Dec 2, 1996).
' See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation
(Harvard 1993); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Rethinking the Progressive Agenda: The Reform of
the American Regulatory State (Free Press 1992); Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights
Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State (Harvard 1990); David Osborne and Ted
Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the
Public Sector (Addison-Wesley 1992); Philip Howard, The Death of Common Sense: How
Law is Suffocating America (Random House 1994).
144 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1997:
and state and local governments.6 Similar efforts are underway
in Mexico.7
Both of these trends have been fueled by a variety of factors,
including changes in technology, prices, and interest group
pressures. For example, telecommunications deregulation was to
some extent driven by interest groups and consumers that could
benefit greatly from relaxing entry barriers in the local phone
service market. In the case of social regulation, governments are
facing increased political pressure to supply greater environmen-
tal, health, and safety protection as societies become wealthier.
Because it is becoming harder to meet the demand for social
regulation, there is political pressure to search for less costly and
more effective alternatives.
In the United States, perhaps the most profound change is
that people are beginning to understand that regulations have
costs as well as benefits. Philip Howard, in his recent best-seller
The Death of Common Sense, makes a strong case that many
regulations are ill-conceived and lead to perverse outcomes.8 This
finding is consistent with recent scholarship that calls for a
rethinking of the regulatory state,9 a central element of which is
to allow for the explicit consideration of costs in regulatory
decisionmaking. 0 Fortunately, consideration of costs is becom-
ing more prominent in regulatory debates both on the national
6 Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-121,
110 Stat 847, 868-74, codified at 5 USC § 551 et seq (1994 & Supp 1996); Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub L No 104-4, 109 Stat 48; Food Quality Protection Act
of 1996, Pub L No 104-170, 110 Stat 1489, 1513-36, codified at 7 USC §136, 21 USC
§§ 321, 331(j), 342(a), 346(a) (1994 & Supp 1996); Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments
of 1996, Pub L No 104-182, 110 Stat 1613, 1621-25, codified at 42 USC § 300g-1(b) (1994
& Supp 1996); Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-
304, 110 Stat 3793, 3794-3800, codified at 49 USC § 60102(a) (1994 & Supp 1996); Omni-
bus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-1, 3009-
1088-89.
' House Cleaning, The Economist S18 (Feb 13, 1993); Secretaria De Comercio Y
Fomento Industrial, Economic Deregulation in Mexico (Dec 1996).
' Philip Howard, The Death of Common Sense: How Law is Suffocating America 3-53
(Random House 1994).
9 Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government's Numbers Tell Us?,
in Robert W. Hahn, ed, Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from Regula-
tion 208 (Oxford 1996). See also note 5.
"0 Kenneth J. Arrow, et al, Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and
Safety Regulation: A Statement of Principles 6 (AEI 1996).
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and state level." Indeed, it would be fair to say that cost is no
longer a "four-letter word" in the political lexicon.
While the benefits and costs of regulation are receiving
increased attention in the policy debate, there is a parallel effort;
underway to develop better information on the subject. 2 This;
Article assesses the benefits and costs of several major environ-
mental, health, and safety regulations passed since 1990; it
suggests ways in which regulatory analysis can be improved in.
the future; and it proposes changes in the regulatory process.
At the outset, let me say that some regulations may be!
desirable from a social point of view, even if the economic bene-
fits fall short of the costs. For example, providing medical assis-
tance and food for society's poor may not increase economic:
efficiency, but it may be the right thing to do for moral reasons.
Similarly, helping to reduce discrimination may be desirable in
principle regardless of its effect on economic efficiency.
But, if the bulk of new regulations have an adverse impact;
on the economy, either through the direct cost of implementing
them or through their adverse impact on innovation and produc-
tivity, their cumulative effect can have major consequences for
society.' Moreover, some individual businesses that are espe.
cially hard hit by regulations are likely to close down or moVE!
overseas. 4 Thus, even when non-economic considerations justify"
certain policies, their economic impact should be assessed so that
they can be implemented in the most effective manner possible.
If Congress is interested in developing regulation that will.
better help the average citizen, it has two basic levers it can con-
trol. First, it can pass "smarter" laws that carefully weigh the
economic benefits and costs of proposed actions. Second, it can
make sure that regulations promulgated under those laws are
crafted in ways that enhance economic welfare.
" See note 6; Susan Eckerly, Virginia's Deregulatory Challenge: A Promising Start,
19 Regulation 63 (No 2, 1996); Dana Joel, Rhetoric vs. Reality: New Jersey Regulatory
Reform, 19 Regulation 53 (No 2, 1996).
1 For a number of studies, see Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 3-29 (cited inL
note 5).
" Brian Goff, Regulation & Macroeconomic Performance 9-22 (Kiuwer 1996); Pau[
MacAvoy, Industry Regulation and the Performance of the American Economy 24 (W.W.
Norton 1992); Gregory Christiansen and Robert Haveman, Public Regulations and the
Slowdown in Productivity Growth, 71 Am Econ Rev 320, 324-25 (May 1981); Robert W.
Hahn, A Preliminary Estimate of Some Indirect Costs of Environmental Regulation (AE][
working paper, Feb 1995).
" Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness,
102 Yale L J 2039, 2084-86 (1993).
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Congress should change the way it does business to take
more careful account of the benefits and costs of regulation it
imposes on state and local governments, the private sector, and
ultimately, the American consumer. Congress should begin by
taking a closer look at the economic impacts of the laws it passes
and it should also allow for costs to be considered in the develop-
ment of all standards and regulations. Currently, the balancing
of benefits and costs is prohibited in parts of several statutes,
including the Clean Air Act" and the Occupational Safety and
Health Act. 6 Congress should not be bashful about asking the
agencies it has created to examine more closely how their rules
and regulations affect the quality of life of the average citizen.
I. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF RECENT REGULATIONS
17
Regulations typically have one of two effects on the size of
the economy. They either expand or shrink the economic pie."
Although the experience of the last twenty years has been mixed,
most new regulations now under consideration would shrink the
size of the economic pie. 9 This is especially true in the areas of
health, safety, and the environment-even when the economic
benefits of those regulations are taken into account.0 It is also
true in areas of traditional price regulation, such as cable televi-
sion."
Below, I present a study representing the most comprehen-
sive analysis of benefits and costs of recent environmental,
health, and safety regulations. Based on over ninety Regulatory
Impact Analyses ("RIAs") of environmental, health, and safety
rules from 1990 to mid-1995, the study lends insight into the
" 42 USC § 7409(b) (1994).
'6 29 USC §§ 652(8), 655(bX5) (1994).
17 The next two sections draw on research presented in Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory
Reform: What Do the Government's Numbers Tell Us?, in Robert W. Hahn, ed, Risks,
Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from Regulation 208 (Oxford 1996). I am
currently expanding this analysis to include a wider array of regulations over a longer
time period.
"S Regulations also have an important impact on the distribution of resources. See,
for example, Richard A. Posner, Regulation by Taxation, 2 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 22
(1971); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J Econ & Mgmt Sci 3
(1971); Roger Noll, Reforming Regulation: An Evaluation of the Ash Council 40 (Brookings
1971).
IS Hahn, Regulatory Reform (cited in note 17).
20 Id.
"I Robert Crandall and Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Cable TV: Regulation of Competition
69-83 (Brookings 1996).
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relative benefits and costs of various regulations as well as the
process by which various agencies evaluate these regulations.22
Table 1 presents an overview of the major rules reviewed for
this study.' The table shows the number and percentage of
regulations for which some part of benefits and costs were quan-
tified by the agency. It also shows the fraction of regulations that
would pass a benefit-cost test based on the agency's dollar esti-
mates of benefits and costs. While costs were estimated for al-
most all rules, benefit estimates were incomplete. Agencies quan-
tified health benefits for just over half of the rules and quantified
monetized benefits for only one-fourth. In less than 20 percent of
the rules, agencies showed that quantified monetary benefits
would exceed quantified costs.
This overview of agency analyses suggests that there is con-
siderable variation in the types of analysis agencies perform for
individual rules. There is also considerable variation in the as-
sumptions, methodology, and overall quality of these analyses.
For example, the discount rate used varies across regulations.24
In addition, agencies often present benefits and costs in particu-
lar years rather than presenting the full stream of benefits and
costs.
According to the requirements of the relevant Executive Orders by President
Reagan (Executive Order No 12,291, 3 CFR 127 (1981)) and President Clinton (Executive
Order No 12,866, 3 CFR 638 (1993)), RIAs are prepared by agencies for all major rules
(Reagan) or significant regulatory actions (Clinton) and reviewed by the Office of Informa-
tion and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA"). Under the Clinton order, a "significant regulatory
action" is one having an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or other-
wise adversely affecting the economy, creating a serious inconsistency or otherwise
interfering with another agency's actions, materially altering the budgetary impact of a
program or the rights and obligations of recipients, or raising novel legal or policy issues.
§ 3(f), 3 CFR at 641-42. Under the Reagan Order a major rule was one likely to result in
an annual effect on the economy of 100 million or more, a major price or cost increase, or
significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, innovation, or inter-
national competitiveness. § 1(b), 3 CFR at 127-28. I examined all available rules from the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration ("OSHA"), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), and
the Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA") over the time period. In addition, I
examined one rule from the Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC"), an indepen-
dent agency exempt from the requirements of the Executive Orders, that would likely
have been considered major.
Hahn, Regulatory Reform at 222 (cited in note 17).
24 The discount rate used generally ranged between 3 and 10 percent. In some cases,
agencies did not discount future benefits or account for latency periods.
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The RIAs suffer from a lack of consistency across and within
agencies. To make the analysis consistent across different pro-
grams and regulations, I converted dollar estimates to 1994 dol-
lars and introduced a common discount rate as well as a consis-
tent set of values for reducing health risks.25 Several conclusions
emerge from my analysis. First, government agency data suggest
that there is a present value of about $280 billion in net benefits
to government regulation since 1990. Yet, as Figure 1 shows,
over half the final rules would not pass a benefit-cost test, even
when we use agency numbers." Aggregate net benefits are posi-
tive because many of the rules that do pass benefit-cost analysis
have substantial benefits. The agencies' analyses suggest that a
substantial number of their own regulations should not be pro-
mulgated if benefit-cost analysis were the sole criterion for judg-
ment. Eliminating final rules that would not pass a benefit-cost
test could increase the present value of net benefits by more than
$115 billion.
Figure I
Distribution of Net Benefits of Fifty-Four Final Regulations
1990 to Mid-1995
16
14
O 12
i
6-
4-
0
-100t0o<-10 -10to <-1 -lto<0 0oID<l lt0o< 10 10 to < 100
Present Valu ofNet Benefits
(billions of 1994 dollars)
2' All dollar figures have been adjusted to 1994 dollars using implicit price deflators
for the gross domestic product, as reported in Council of Economic Advisers, Economic
Report of the President 341-352 (GPO 1995). A five percent real discount rate is used in
the base case.
26 Hahn, Regulatory Reform at 220 (cited in note 17)
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Without a detailed evaluation of each rule, it is difficult to
say how individual analyses are likely to be biased. However,
there are reasons not to take the agencies' numbers at face value.
While economic arguments are ambiguous, both political theory
and empirical evidence suggest that agencies are likely to over-
state substantially the aggregate numbers for net benefits.27 For
example, agencies with a single objective (for instance, protecting
the environment or improving safety in the workplace) have an
incentive to overstate the benefits of their program relative to the
costs so they can better meet the demands of interest groups or
so they can expand their regulatory reach.
In addition, I found some marked discrepancies between
agency estimates and what neutral economists projected in terms
of benefits and costs. The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments pro-
vide an instructive example.28 As a participant in the formula-
tion of that Act, I conducted a benefit-cost analysis for the Coun-
cil of Economic Advisers ("CEA"). That analysis suggested that
the amendments, when fully implemented, would result in sub-
stantial net costs to the economy--on the order of $10 billion to
$20 billion annually.29 Those estimated net costs are hard to
square with the government's estimated $50 billion in net pres-
ent value benefits. 0
II. How TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF THE ANALYSIS
If benefit-cost analysis is to play a greater role in agency
decisionmaking, the quality of the analysis must be improved
dramatically. Changes that would improve the quality of analysis
include making key assumptions explicit-something that cur-
rent regulatory impact analyses frequently fail to do; 31 using
best estimates and appropriate ranges to reflect uncertainty;
providing estimates of the net present value of benefits and costs;
and summarizing sensitivity analyses and base-case results.32
2' Id at 224-225.
2 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub L No 101-549, 104 Stat 2399, codified at
42 USC § 7401 et seq (1994).
29 Robert W. Hahn, U.S. Environmental Policy: Past, Present and Future, 34 Nat
Resources J 305, 320-21 (1994). See also Paul R. Portney, Policy Watch: Economics and
the Clean Air Act, 4 J Econ Persp 173, 179 (Fall 1990).
Hahn, Regulatory Reform (cited in note 17).
'Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government's Numbers Tell Us?,
in Robert W. Hahn, ed, Risks, Costs, and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from Regula-
tion 208 (Oxford 1996).
32 See generally, Kenneth J. Arrow, et al, Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental,
Health, and Safety Regulation: A Statement of Principles (AEI 1996) (detailing these and
REAL REGULATORY REFORM
Some of those changes were embodied in regulatory reform bills
considered by the 104th Congress.3
Agencies could improve the quality of their overall analysis
by using a common set of economic assumptions, as I did in my
analysis. This would make it easier to compare results for differ-
ent regulations. Variables for which common assumptions should
be used include: the social discount rate, the value of reducing
risks of death and accidents, the value of reducing different kinds
of pollution, and the value associated with improvements in
health. A single agency, such as the Office of Management and
Budget ("OMB") or the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO"),
should be given the responsibility for developing key values for
different variables based on the best economic and scientific
evidence available.' The use of a common set of assumptions
should not preclude the introduction of other values as variables
where appropriate.
An agency such as the OMB or CBO should also develop a
standard format for presenting results in a clear and succinct
manner. A good summary and clear analysis will make it easier
for policymakers and interested parties to evaluate results. In
addition, transparency is necessary if such analysis is to enjoy
broad public support.
Agencies should also do more peer review to improve the
quality of analysis, but the nature of this review needs to be
carefully designed. One problem is that many academic reviewers
often receive government support from agencies whose rules
require review. This was the case, for example, in the EPA study
on the benefits and costs of the Clean Air Act regulations." If
other reform proposals); Hahn, Regulatory Reform (cited in note 31).
' Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Act of 1995, HR 1022, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb
23, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec H 2261 (Feb 27, 1996); Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S 291,
104th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 27, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec S 1711 (Jan 27, 1995); Comprehen-
sive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S 343, 104th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 2, 1995), in 141
Cong Rec S 9261 (June 28, 1995); Regulatory Procedures Reform Act of 1995, S 1001,
104th Cong, 1st Sess (June 19, 1995), in 141 Cong Rec S 9481 (June 30, 1995).
For example, HR 1022 specified principles for risk assessment and characterization.
For an insightful critique of one of the regulatory reform bills, see Edward Warren,
Reforming Regulatory Reform: Doing Better with Less, in Robert W. Hahn, ed, Reviving
Regulatory Reform (forthcoming 1997). The author presents a simpler alternative that
would modify the Administrative Procedure Act, effectively requiring agencies to do "more
good than harm" when regulating.
OMB has published comprehensive guidelines for preparing economic analyses.
OMB Document on 'Best Practices' for Preparing Economic Analyses of Regulatory Action,
Daily Envir Rep (Jan 22, 1996). However, it is not clear that OMB will actually enforce
these guidelines.
' U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act,
143]
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government support for research can bias the opinions of individ-
uals, then it may be necessary to identify some reviewers with
expertise who do not receive agency support. It would also be
helpful to preserve some degree of anonymity for the review-
ers."6 A second problem with peer review as currently practiced
is that agencies often select the reviewers. To address this prob-
lem, an agency more interested in economic efficiency, such as
OMB or CEA, should have more say in selecting reviewers of
regulations. A final problem is that academic experts may not
have a strong enough incentive to peer review studies that re-
quire a very large time commitment, such as that required by the
EPA Clean Air Act study. The solution to this problem is to
change the nature of the process--either by providing them with
staff support or asking them to focus on important issues that
were not considered adequately in the original analysis.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORMING THE PROCESS
The critical question for regulatory reform is how best to
hold regulators and legislators more accountable for regulations.
Below, I offer ten specific suggestions for regulatory reform.
While many of the suggestions would require additional resourc-
es, the resources would be well spent if they led to a more rea-
soned evaluation of the benefits and costs of regulations.37
First, Congress should come clean on the economic benefits
and costs of regulation to the American public. Currently, costs
tend to be hidden from view. For example, the consumer is rarely
aware of the several hundred dollars paid for pollution control
equipment on a new car,38 or the costs associated with recent
proposals to improve airline safety.39 Indeed, my recent research
shows that the regulatory agencies have failed to measure sys-
tematically the costs they impose on the private sector.40 A re-
1970 to 1990 (EPA 1997).
'" Complete anonymity may be desirable to enhance objectivity. There may also be
some value in drawing reviewers from a pool of experts, where the pool members are
publicly known, but the specific reviewers are not. I am indebted to Randy Lutter for this
suggestion.
" Likewise, the uncertainty inevitable in rigorous benefit-cost analysis, although
problematic, does not justify abandoning such analysis altogether.
Robert Crandall, et al, Regulating the Automobile 27-43 (Brookings 1986).
Peter Passell, Economic Scene: In Airline Safety, Too Much Vigilance Can Be a Bad
Thing, NY Times D2 (Sept 5, 1996); Robert W. Hahn, The Economics of Airline Safety and
Security: An Analysis of the White House Commission's Recommendations, 20 Harv J L &
Pub Pol (forthcoming Spring 1997).
o Robert W. Hahn, ed, Reviving Regulatory Reform (forthcoming 1997).
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cent survey of regulatory agencies conducted by Congressman
Thomas J. Bliley confirms this result.41 These regulatory costs
should be reported in a "regulatory budget" that goes to Congress
each year. Similarly, estimates of the benefits of regulation
should be reported where they can be quantified. While the esti-
mates are likely to be quite uncertain in some cases, even crude
estimates of benefits and costs can be beneficial in the policy
debate. The recent regulatory accountability provision, which
requires OMB to report on the benefits and costs of regulatory
programs by September 1997, represents a step in the right di-
rection.42
Second, Congress should introduce a binding regulatory bud-
get on an experimental basis.' The design of this budget is crit-
ical. Such a budget should have three key features. First, Con-
gress should set expenditure limits for different kinds of regula-
tion. This could be done by statute, by program, by agency, or for
all regulatory agencies. Second, a neutral scorer should deter-
mine if the expenditure limits are met. My preference would be
to have an independent agency modeled after the Federal Re-
serve, but short of that, I would look to the CBO, which already
does scoring for the budget and which has a reputation for im-
partiality. If the expenditure limits are exceeded, the President
could submit a request to Congress for an increase in the regula-
tory budget authority or Congress could choose to increase the
budgetary authority on its own. Third, the budget would apply
only to those rules for which the expected costs exceed the ex-
pected benefits. Rules that would pass a benefit-cost test would
be exempted. The regulatory budget would thus increase account-
ability, but would not stop rules that were expected to improve
the well-being of the average citizen from going forward."
Third, Congress should provide an additional incentive for
agencies to balance benefits and costs carefully by enacting a law
" Letter from Thomas J. Bliley, Congressman to Regulatory Agencies (Mar 5, 1996)
(on file with author); Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Neglect of Costs in Federal Regulation:
Benign or Malignant?, presented at Regulatory Reform: Making Costs Count (American
Enterprise Institute Conference, Dec 9, 1996).
2 Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-
1, 3009-1088-89.
" I spell out this proposal in greater detail in Hahn, Reviving Reform (cited in note
40).
" The primary difficulty with a regulatory budget lies in estimating the relevant
benefits and costs. There may be large uncertainties around even the most narrow defini-
tions of costs, such as "end of pipe" costs. These uncertainties could be reduced over time
as experience is gained with benefit and cost estimation procedures.
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that requires such balancing. Such a law is likely to have more
force than the Executive Orders issued by recent Presidents for
two reasons. 5 First, it could apply to a broader range of regula-
tions and agencies. It could reach independent agencies whose
status is thought to preclude excessive Presidential control, as
well as regulations promulgated under statutes that preclude
benefit-cost balancing." Second, lawyers serving in government
are more likely to comply with a law that requires careful balanc-
ing than with an executive order, particularly in cases where the
majority party in either the House or the Senate helps to assure
compliance with the law.47
The proposed law should apply prospectively to both new
laws and regulations. Specifically, Congress should highlight the
importance of using benefit-cost analysis in the development of
regulations, the need to identify and evaluate realistic alterna-
tives, and the importance of selecting alternatives that maximize
expected net benefits. While it should not require that every
regulation pass a strict economic benefit-cost test, the new law
should shift th burden of proof so that fewer regulations impose
major net costs on the average American consumer." As a first
step toward taking economic analysis of regulations more serious-
ly, Congress could pass a version of one of the recent executive
orders on regulatory oversight. Such a law would have more force
than an executive order for the reasons mentioned above.
Fourth, Congress should encourage the courts to review
regulations based on a kind of benefit-cost criterion by stating
that this criterion should be a primary factor in developing regu-
lations. Several scholars have argued that the courts are moving
" Executive Order No 12,291, 3 CFR 127 (1981) (establishing regulatory analysis);
Executive Order No 12,498, 3 CFR 323 (1985) (establishing regulatory planning process);
Executive Order No 12,866, 3 CFR 638 (1993) (establishing regulatory planning and
review); See Stephen G. Breyer and Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law and Regula-
tory Policy 107-11, Supp 5-18 (Little, Brown 1992 & Supp 1996).
' Major independent agencies include the Federal Communications Commission, the
Federal Trade Commission, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Note that indepen-
dent agencies are covered to a limited extent by the Clinton Order. § 4(b), (c), 3 CFR 638,
642-42 (cited in note 43). See notes 15 and 16 for examples of statutes precluding benefit-
cost balancing.
"7 In 1982, the Senate unanimously passed such a bill, suggesting that some kind of
sensible regulatory reform is feasible. Regulatory Reform Act, S 1080, 97th Cong, 1st Ses
(July 17, 1981), in 128 Cong Rec S 5297 (Mar 24, 1982).
" One way of shifting the burden of proof would be to make the economic analysis on
which the administrative decision rests subject to judicial review, as was contemplated in
the Comprehensive Regulatory Reform Act of 1995, S 343, 104th Cong, 1st Seas (Feb 2,
1995), in 141 Cong Rec S 9261 (June 28, 1995).
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in this direction.49 Edward Warren and Gary Marchant argue
that courts should judge the legality of regulations in the context
of doing "more good than harm"-which is a kind of layman's
benefit-cost test.5° In other words, the Administrative Procedure
Act, which calls for invalidation of agency actions that are "arbi-
trary, capricious or an abuse of discretion,"51 should be read to
create a strong preference for economic efficiency.52
Fifth, Congress should expand the capacity of OMB and CBO
to review important laws and regulations. For example, CBO
could assess the expected benefits and costs of proposed laws as
well as "score" regulations if a regulatory budget were enacted.
At the same time, OMB could review major regulations that were
proposed as a result of the laws. After the review is complete, the
head of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA")
should sign a statement accompanying the executive summary of
the RIA, stating his or her approval of that analysis.53
This recommendation is consistent with the technocratic
thrust of Justice Breyer's book, Breaking the Vicious Circle.54
OMB currently has a very small staff of economists and policy
analysts; thus, it can do only a cursory review of only the most
important regulations.5 In the short term, Congress should allo-
cate more resources to OMB for hiring scientists and economists
who would improve the quality and scope of the regulatory re-
view process. Similarly, CBO's staff should be increased to deal
with new demands placed on it to provide timely information on
the development of laws that have important regulatory impacts.
A new division in CBO, similar to the OIRA within OMB, may
need to be created.
Sixth, Congress should consider vesting the power for regula-
tory review in an independent agency patterned after the Federal
"' See, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State, in Hahn, ed, Reviving
Reform (cited in note 40).
b' Edward W. Warren and Gary E. Marchant, More Good Than Harm: A First Princi-
ple for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 Ecol L Q 379, 405-08 (1993).
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 USC § 706(2)(A) (1994).
' Warren and Marchant, 20 Ecol L Q at 407 (cited in note 50).
5 In addition, the head of the OIRA could be allowed to note any important deficien-
cies in the RIA. The point of having the head expressly note their approval would be to
hold them more accountable for the analysis contained therein. This accountability would
be even more important if statutes allow for judicial review.
Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation 59-
61 (Harvard 1993).
In 1996, the OIRA employed only 41 professionals. Full-time equivalent employ-
ment at federal regulatory agencies is more than 130,000. P. Wayne Walker, ed, 1996
Federal Staff Directory (CQ Fall 1996).
143]
156 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1997:
Reserve. A relatively autonomous, independent agency is likely to
be more insulated from political pressures. It would be in a bet-
ter position to make difficult decisions on promoting more effec-
tive and efficient regulation. Such an agency would need to be
designed with a clearly stated objective (for example, to perform
analyses that attempt to maximize the net economic benefits
from regulation) and with a group of professionals that would be
able to gain legitimacy."
Seventh, Congress should introduce sunset requirements so
that agencies and their missions would have to be re-evaluated
periodically."7 While sunset provisions and retrospective assess-
ments can consume valuable time and resources, they can benefit
the public by inducing agencies to ask serious questions about
the quality and costs of the services they are trying to deliver.
They can also induce Congress to revisit the enabling statutes.
Eighth, Congress needs to address existing regulations as
well as new regulations. It should direct OMB and relevant agen-
cies to review at least ten major existing regulations each year,
with an eye toward modifying them to ensure that they are pro-
ducing benefits in excess of costs or eliminating those that do not
pass such a test. In addition, regulations should be modified so
that they are implemented in the most cost-effective manner
possible. OMB would be required to issue a report on its review,
together with the information it provides to Congress in its regu-
latory budget.5"
Ninth, Congress should move away from the one-size-fits-all
approach. Instead of requiring specified technical fixes for smoke-
stacks, or uniform standards regulating food safety, flexibility
should be encouraged so long as the overarching social goals are
achieved. Congress and the regulatory agencies should define the
overall objectives but allow individuals and businesses the flexi-
' In his book, Justice Breyer suggests developing a technocratic elite that would
rotate through agencies to gain expertise. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle at 59-61
(cited in note 54). While it would be advantageous for some members of an independent
agency to have a good working knowledge of different regulatory agencies, I do not think
all professional members of the independent agency should necessarily be required to take
part in the rotation. Furthermore, there is a danger that bureaucrats overseeing the
process could be co-opted by particular agencies, depending on their incentives.
"' A "sunset" provision requires periodic review and approval of a law for the law to
remain in effect. Black's Law Dictionary 1436 (West 6th ed 1990).
" It is not necessary, and is potentially counter-productive, to allow anyone to peti-
tion the relevant agency or OMB to review any existing rule, as Congress considered in its
last legislative session. Such a provision could paralyze the regulatory process and
needlessly polarize the debate over regulatory reform.
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bility to achieve these goals in the least expensive way, thus
promoting innovation. For example, Congress is using a market-
based approach to achieve a ten million ton reduction in sulfur
dioxide emissions.59 This more flexible approach is expected to
save over $13 billion relative to an approach that requires partic-
ular technologies."
Furthermore, there are several cases where more flexibility
could help achieve social objectives while reducing cost. For ex-
ample, Amoco's Yorktown Refinery was required to spend $31
million to reduce a small amount of benzene from its wastewater
treatment plant, when it could have reduced five times as much
benzene elsewhere in the refinery at a cost of only $6 million."'
Unfortunately, Amoco was not given the flexibility to make the
more prudent investment, despite the fact that it would have cost
less and improved the environment at the same time.
Finally, if Congress is truly serious about changing the na-
ture of regulation, it should revisit the statutes that it has enact-
ed over the last two decades with an eye toward promoting great-
er flexibility and economic efficiency. For some programs, such as
Superfund,5 ' Congress may want to move responsibilities back
to the states. For other laws, such as those governing airport
safety, Congress will want to allow for the economic costs of leg-
islation to be weighed against the benefits of the law. For eco-
nomic regulation, such as in the banking and electricity indus-
tries, Congress should allow greater competition. Finally, laws
that no longer serve a useful social purpose, such as the Davis-
Bacon Act," should be eliminated.
5' Clean Air Act, 42 USC § 7651(b) (1994).
Robert Hahn, The Politics and Religion of Clean Air, 13 Regulation 21, 22 (No 1,
1990); ICF, Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Final Acid Rain Implementation Regula-
tions ES4-ES7, Prepared for EPA (Oct 19, 1992).
"' Amoco and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Amoco/US EPA Pollution
Prevention Project: Project Summary (1992). The report did not give the year dollar, so I
have not updated those figures to 1994 dollars. See also Keith Schneider, Unbending
Regulations Incite Move to Alter Pollution Laws, NY Times Al (Nov 29, 1993).
62 Comprehensive Environmental, Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
USC § 9601 et seq (1994).
0 46 Stat 1494 (1931), codified at 40 USC § 2 7 6a(a) (1994). The Davis-Bacon Act both
increases the cost of government contracts and is biased against minority hiring. Timothy
J. Pendolino, The Davis-Bacon and Service Contract Acts: Laws Whose Time Has Passed?,
147 Milit L Rev 218, 249-52, 253-55 (1995).
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CONCLUSION
Congress has a unique opportunity to reform the federal
regulatory process. These reforms can be best achieved by care-
fully examining how the existing regulatory process is working.
My analytical review of recent regulations suggests that the
process is not working as well as it could be.
I have suggested several ways in which the regulatory pro-
cess could be improved. The most important steps that can be
taken in the near term are: making the process more transparent
to the public by annually publishing more detailed information
on the benefits and costs of proposed and final regulations; im-
proving the quality of economic analysis of proposed and final
regulations; passing laws that encourage civil servants and ad-
ministrators to be more sensitive to the benefits and costs they
impose on the public; developing "smarter" regulations that har-
ness the power of the marketplace to achieve social objectives at
lower cost; and rethinking the appropriate scope of federal regu-
lation when the substantive statutes are rewritten.
